1. Design the safety architecture for a learned whole-body policy operating near people.
Model answer
The governing principle: do not ask the learned policy to be the safety system. A neural network trained on demonstrations gives you no bound on what it emits when the input is out of distribution. Safety comes from layers below and beside it that are simple enough to reason about.
Layered defence, outermost inward:
- Physical and electrical. Hardware emergency stop wired to actuator power, independent of software. Mechanical design that limits stored energy and pinch hazards. This layer must work when every computer on the robot is wedged.
- Firmware limits. Per-joint torque, velocity and position limits enforced below the control stack, plus impedance or compliance so an unexpected contact yields instead of pushing through. A learned policy commanding a nonsensical target should produce a bounded motion, not a maximum-torque swing.
- Runtime monitors. Independent processes watching proximity to humans, contact force, tracking error, and control-loop timing, with the authority to slow or stop. Kept simple deliberately, because a monitor you cannot reason about is not a monitor.
- Speed and separation. Scale allowed velocity with distance to the nearest person. This is the standard industrial collaborative-robot idea and it maps directly onto a humanoid. Full speed when the cell is clear, reduced when someone enters, stop on close approach.
- Behavioural. Predictable, legible motion so people can anticipate the robot. Sudden reorientation near a person is unsafe even if it never makes contact.
Then the process layer, which interviewers care about as much as the architecture: a hazard analysis that enumerates failure modes before you write code, staged deployment from caged to supervised to shared space, near-miss logging treated as a leading indicator, and a change-control path so a model update goes through the same gate as a firmware update. Regulatory reality: a humanoid in a customer facility sits under industrial machinery safety expectations, and "the model was trained not to do that" is not an argument you can make to a safety assessor.
Worth sketching. The learned policy sits inside the constraint layers, not above them.
flowchart TD
A["Learned policy<br/>joint targets"] --> B["Rate and range limiter"]
B --> C["Whole-body controller<br/>with balance constraints"]
C --> D["Firmware torque and<br/>impedance limits"]
D --> E["Actuators"]
F["Proximity and force<br/>monitors"] --> G["Slow or stop<br/>supervisor"]
G --> D
H["Hardware E-stop"] --> EFollow-ups: How would you validate the monitors themselves? What changes when the robot walks rather than stands at a fixed station?